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Abstract
This article examines the appointments and survival of expert ministers (i.e., ministers with educational and professional
expertise in the portfolio towhich they are appointed) in newdemocracies. Using a novel data set on 11 Central and Eastern
European countries from1990 until 2012, I test competing hypotheses derived fromdelegation theory, communist legacies
approach, technocratic populism studies, and semi-presidentialism literature. The first study shows that experts without
political experience (technocrats) have specific cabinet appointment patterns distinguishing them from party politicians
and politically experienced experts. For example, technocrats have high chances of being appointed during an economic
downturn. The conditional risk set survival analysis has revealed that compared to their politically experienced colleagues,
technocrats have higher chances of remaining in their positions if therewas a change in the PM’s candidacy.Moreover, they
have long careers independently of the continuity of the PM’s party in government and the PM’s partisan status. Strikingly,
patterns of portfolio specialization from the communist period remained in place after the regime change (e.g., expert
ministers holding the portfolios of finance and economy). However, holding these specific portfolios does not decrease
the minister’s risk of being dismissed. These findings have ramifications for issues surrounding cabinet formation, institu-
tional choice, and populism in new democracies.
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1. Introduction
Populism and populists are on the rise around the
world. What unites populists is the appeal to ‘ordi-
nary people’ and the massive critique of the ‘political
establishment’—although these politicians might have
been an integral part of this establishment themselves
(e.g., Donald Trump in theUnited States). Populists argue
that ‘the people’ are the sovereign that was robbed of
their sovereignty by ‘the corrupt elites’ and only they,
the populists, can restore justice (e.g., Mudde, 2004).
Populismhas been seen as an alternative to party democ-
racy. Technocracy, or the governance by technical exper-
tise, is allegedly another alternative (Caramani, 2017).
Recently, a new form of populism well known from Latin
American context (e.g., Rafael Correa in Ecuador) has
begun to appear in European countries, exemplified by
Emmanuel Macron of France and Andrej Babiš of the
Czech Republic. Using a technocratic approach, these
politicians connect populist promises to politics, claiming
to produce better policies in a more efficient way (e.g.,
Buštíková & Guasti, 2019; Havlík, 2019). Technocratic
populism represents a new threat to party democracy
and, therefore, warrants close examination.
Studies of technocratic populism have provided cru-
cial insights for a better understanding of presidential
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leadership (e.g., de la Torre, 2013), and the political
style of techno-populist prime ministers (e.g., Buštíková
& Guasti, 2019; Havlík, 2019; Valbruzzi, 2018; see also
contributions on France, Italy, and Georgia in this the-
matic issue). Researchers have also looked at techno-
populist policy agenda setting and policy implementa-
tion, particularly in the Latin American context (e.g.,
de la Torre, 2013; Roberts, 1995). One understudied
aspect of technocratic populism is how populists use
technocracy as a strategy to realize their policy pref-
erences and gain public support. The most apparent
strategy is to use technocratic discourse during politi-
cal campaigns (e.g., Buštíková & Guasti, 2019). Another
strategy—complementary to the first one—is to appoint
technocrats to government. In doing so, politicians signal
to other parties and to the electorate that not only they
will run the state efficiently, but also that they know the
right persons to do this job on their behalf (see also con-
tribution on Italy in this thematic issue). The latter aspect
(i.e., the reasons for technocratic appointments to gov-
ernments) is the focus of this article.
I argue that new democracies of Central and Eastern
Europe provide a fruitful ground for using technocratic
expertise in government for two reasons. The first is
party systems’ weakness and blurred societal cleavages
in these countries (e.g., Whitefield, 2002). After decades
of communist domination, the transition to democracy
provided a unique window of opportunities for new par-
ties (Lewis, 2002). Despite developing under challeng-
ing conditions (e.g., the lack of territorial party organi-
zations, high electoral and party volatility, and strategi-
cally disloyal behavior of politicians; see, e.g., Semenova,
2015; Tavits, 2005), party systems in new democra-
cies have become more consolidated over time. Since
the 2000s, party systems of new democracies have
become more fragmented. Unorthodox parties of var-
ious stances—including (centrist) populist parties with
the high personalization of leadership and technocratic
appeal—have emerged and became electorally success-
ful (e.g., Pop-Eleches, 2010). The electoral success of
newly emerged unorthodox parties has been considered
one of the reasons for an increased demand for technoc-
racy and technocrats in new democracies (e.g., Buštíková
&Guasti, 2019). The second reason is a generally positive
perception of technocracy and technocrats among the
public and politicians of new democracies (e.g., Bertsou
& Pastorella, 2017). I argue that public preference for
technocracy originated in the late communist period,
when professional expertise in the respective policy area
became the primary credential for a government posi-
tion (e.g., Hanley & Treiman, 2005). These communist
legacies have continued to affect cabinet formation in
new democracies even after the collapse of communism
(Semenova, 2018).
This article examines the appointment of expert min-
isters (i.e., ministers with educational and professional
expertise in the portfolio to which they are appointed)
to cabinets in 11 post-communist countries of Central
and Eastern Europe. In doing so, I consider two research
questions. The first is under what circumstances a min-
ister’s expertise has been an important credential for
being appointed to a cabinet. The second question is
how the PMs and popularly elected presidents influence
the survival of ministers in post-communist countries.
Using delegation theory, semi-presidentialism, techno-
cratic populism, and communist legacy studies, I show
that the value of expertise differs among ministers with
and without political experience. The results of a binary
logistic regression estimated in this article have shown
that experts without political experience have specific
appointment patterns distinguishing them from party
politicians in government. Using a conditional risk set Cox
regression model, I provide evidence that technocrats
have different patterns of survival in cabinet compared
to their politically experienced colleagues.
This article contributes to the existing literature in
four ways. First, it demonstrates that expert ministers
with different profiles are more likely to be appointed
under specific institutional, political, and cultural circum-
stances. Although scholars have addressed the appoint-
ment of ministers recruited from outside of parliaments
(also experts, e.g., Neto & Strøm, 2006; Semenova,
2018), few have considered experts specifically (but see,
Bertsou & Caramani, 2020) or delineated the effects of
political, institutional, and economic determinants on
the recruitment of different types of expert ministers—
both of which this article seeks to do. Second, this
article contributes to the literature on the effects of
economic and political crises on the appointment of
experts (e.g., Pastorella, 2016) by showing that, in
post-communist countries, a poor economic situation
is a decisive factor in the appointment of technocrats
but not of expert ministers with political experience.
Third, this article contributes to the discussion of com-
munist legacies (e.g., Kitschelt, 1995) by demonstrating
how recruitment and portfolio allocation patterns origi-
nated in the communist period effectministerial appoint-
ments in the post-communist period. Fourth, the arti-
cle contributes to the literature on ministerial survival
by showing differences in the survival of technocrats
and politically experienced ministers. This article intro-
duces the original data set on ministerial recruitment
in 11 new EU Members states of Central and Eastern
Europe. The findings presented in this study have rami-
fications for issues surrounding cabinet formation, min-
isterial careers, institutional choice, populism, and party
politics in new democracies.
2. Cabinet Appointment of Expert Ministers:
Theoretical Considerations
The appointments of technocrats (i.e., ministers those
primary credentials are their professional expertise and
not their party experience) expose two theoretical
divides in the literature. The first is whether party democ-
racy is the dominant model of the political process or
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there are alternatives to it. The second is whether the
party government is the best strategy to govern. In stud-
ies on cabinet formation, these divides often operational-
ize through the value of political experience versus exper-
tise for ministers.
Starting with the question about party democracy,
most approaches to ministerial appointments can be
arranged between delegation theory and technocratic
populism, representing the opposite sides of this con-
tinuum. Delegation theory embraces party democracy.
It considers the formation of cabinet is just a step in
the delegation chain, i.e., the voters elect political par-
ties; the winning political parties build a government
and select the PM who is, in turn, in charge of select-
ing their ministers (Strøm, Müller, & Bergman, 2008).
Delegation theory predicts two important factors for the
understanding of ministerial appointments. The first is
that the relationship between the PMand theirministers
may be conflicted because of the asymmetry of informa-
tion between the sides and the possibility that ministers
may pursue a hidden agenda. The second is that the PM
and political parties try to minimize delegation conflicts
by carefully screening the candidates for a ministerial
position and testing their political loyalty. Parliaments
and party organizations are the best platforms for such
screening because the principals have a large number of
candidates whom theymay observe over a longer period
(e.g., Blondel & Thiébault, 1991; Dowding & Dumont,
2009; Huber & Martinez-Gallardo, 2008).
In contrast, technocratic populism rejects party
democracy and mainstream parties of all ideological
orientations (Bickerton & Invernizzi Accetti, 2017). Like
other types of populism, technocratic populists criticize
political parties and other institutes of mediation as
unnecessary and prone to manipulation and corruption
(Bickerton & Invernizzi Accetti, 2017). They also criticize
the ideas of procedural legitimacy by arguing that the
source of legitimacy is ‘the ordinary people.’ Instead,
“technocratic populism strategically uses the appeal of
technocratic competence and weaponizes numbers to
deliver a populist message” (Buštíková & Guasti, 2019,
p. 304). For technocratic populists, ministers with politi-
cal experience represent the ‘establishment’ and should,
therefore, be excluded from the pool of ministeriables.
These approaches also oppose each other in their
perception of whether party government is the best
available option to govern, a question related to the
value of professional expertise for cabinet ministers. For
delegation theory, the minister’s professional expertise
does not play any prominent role. Indeed, it expects that
ministers provide political guidance according to their
party’s preferences, while professional expertise is pro-
vided by bureaucrats in the respective ministries (Huber,
2000). Delegation theory suggests that the appoint-
ments of experts increase the asymmetry of informa-
tion between the PM and the minister, which may
allow expert ministers to extract greater benefits from
their position—either in terms of policy or material
assets—than the PM would like. Sometimes, experts
must be appointed (e.g., because of public expectations
that a good performance in some portfolios can only
be achieved by experts; see Bakema & Secker, 1988).
Nevertheless, the delegation theory predicts that these
expert ministers will have political experience because
the minister’s party loyalty will decrease the probability
of delegation problems between the PM and her minis-
ters and ensure party preferences in the policy areas con-
trolled by expert ministers.
For delegation theory, the appointments of expert
ministers without political experience (i.e., technocrats)
are dysfunctional. Researchers on parliamentary systems
characterize these appointments as a consequence of
a political (e.g., coalition conflicts) or economic crisis
(Alexiadou & Gunaydin, 2019; McDonnell & Valbruzzi,
2014; Pastorella, 2016). However, the appointment of
politically inexperienced experts is often of a short
duration. Delegation theory expects that after crisis cli-
maxes, the party government will be reinstalled, and
politically experienced ministers will replace their tech-
nocratic counterparts (e.g., Semenova, 2018; Yong &
Hazell, 2011).
Technocratic populism, in contrast, maintains that
only technocrats can provide solutions to the problems
that are relevant to the entire society, as opposed to
particularistic decision-making essential to party govern-
ment (e.g., Bickerton & Invernizzi Accetti, 2017; Havlík,
2019). Appointing technocrats is a crucial strategy for
increasing the legitimacy of the populist government and
creating public acceptance for neoliberal reforms (e.g.,
Buštíková & Guasti, 2019; Roberts, 1995). Moreover,
during political crises, populists prefer to appoint tech-
nocrats in order to make their government functional
and less conflictual (Pastorella, 2016; Valbruzzi, 2018).
Between both approaches (i.e., delegation theory
and technocratic populism) lie semi-presidentialism
and communist legacies approaches. Similar to tech-
nocratic populism, semi-presidential studies consider
the appointments of politically inexperienced minis-
ters rational. Scholars have maintained that in semi-
presidentialism—where PMs have to share executive
powers with the popularly elected president (Elgie, 1999,
p. 13)—the presidents have greater institutional pow-
ers to influence the government formation, for instance,
by refusing to confirm the ministers proposed by the
PM or even appointing some ministers discretionally
(Semenova&Dowding, 2019; Tavits, 2009). Furthermore,
non-partisan ministers promoted by the president are
considered his natural allies; therefore, their appoint-
ments are just one strategy to ensure the realiza-
tion of presidential policy preferences in government
(Neto & Strøm, 2006; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009;
Tavits, 2009). Most importantly, the survival of such
ministers depends on presidential support (Semenova,
2018; Semenova & Dowding, 2019). Unlike technocratic
populism, semi-presidentialism studies do not exam-
ine the importance of the minister’s expertise for cab-
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inet appointments. Presidential appointees have to be
non-partisan, although they may also be experts (e.g.,
Tavits, 2009).
Finally, communist legacy studies suggest that the
ministers’ professional experience is the most critical
criterion for their appointments. I posit that two com-
munist legacies are particularly influential. The first is
the importance of a professional education and rele-
vant occupational experience for ministers. As scholars
on communist politics have underlined (e.g., Harasymiw,
1984), from the early 1970s until the collapse of commu-
nism, political (i.e., within the Communist Party hierar-
chy) and professional careers (including ministerial posi-
tions) were largely separated and required different cre-
dentials. For entry to party positions, political loyalty was
the major credential. For entry into professional posi-
tions, tertiary education and relevant occupational expe-
rience were necessary (Hanley & Treiman, 2005; Hough,
1973, p. 6). Using the legacy argument, I expect that this
pattern continued to be in place after the regime change,
particularly in countries with high political continuity
after the collapse of communism. The second legacy that
might survive the collapse of communism is the pat-
tern of specialization within bureaucratic organizations.
As Hough (1973, pp. 142–143) has revealed, in the Soviet
Union, somepolicy areasweremore often occupied than
others by bureaucrats with relevant educational and pro-
fessional experience. Among these policy areas were
government positions in the military, economy, health,
education, science, and technology. Because many prac-
tices developed in the Soviet Union were later adopted
by other communist countries (e.g., Hanley & Treiman,
2005), I assume that other communist countries shared
these preferences for experts in the aforementioned
policy areas. These preferences were also likely to sur-
vive the collapse of communism because technocratic
leadership as a form of governance enjoys strong pub-
lic support in former communist countries (Bertsou &
Pastorella, 2017).
By stressing the minister’s expertise as a significant
credential for cabinet appointments, communist legacies
studies resemble the technocratic populism approach.
However, the legacies approach does not rejectministers
with political experience from the ministerables, as tech-
nocratic populists do. Instead, the legacies approach con-
siders expert ministers the norm rather than the dysfunc-
tional exception. It expects that both PMs and popularly
elected presidents should actively appoint suchministers
(independently of their political experience).
To test the expectations derived from four types of
literature (i.e., delegation theory, technocratic populism,
semi-presidentialism, and communist legacies), I con-
ducted two studies. The first study dealt with the deter-
minants of the appointments of expert ministers to cabi-
nets in post-communist countries. It answered questions
about who is selected and under what circumstances.
The second study analyzed the determinants of ministe-
rial tenures in cabinets; to this end, the research question
concerns who remains in cabinets longer and what that
tells us about the power of PMs and presidents.
3. The Operationalization of Expert Ministers
This article will focus on the appointments of two groups
of expert ministers. The first group consists of min-
isters who are experts in their policy area (i.e., they
have advanced educational training and relevant pro-
fessional experience; see Camerlo & Pérez-Liñán, 2015,
p. 318) and they had no parliamentary or party-leading
experience (compare McDonnell & Valbruzzi, 2014);
I define these ministers as technocrats. The second
group includes ministers who are experts in their pol-
icy area with parliamentary and/or party-leading experi-
ence; these ministers are politically experienced experts.
Because membership in each of these groups is counted
at the time of the minister’s first appointment to cab-
inet, it is mutually exclusive. The residual category
includes party politicians (i.e., politicians with leading
party and/or parliamentary experience) without exper-
tise in their portfolio.
4. The Determinants of the Appointments of Experts to
Central and Eastern European Cabinets
4.1. Hypotheses and Indicators
Each type of the literature (i.e., delegation theory, semi-
presidentialism, technocratic populism, and communist
legacies approaches) predict the recruitment of min-
isters with different types of credentials. The delega-
tion theory predicts that experts are recruited to the
cabinet if PMs and presidents have powers to do so
(the political opportunity argument) and if they have
an increased need for expertise during crises. Starting
with the political opportunity argument, the type of
cabinet is expected to structure the PM’s opportuni-
ties to appoint expert ministers (see the Supplementary
File for indicators and descriptive statistics). Compared
to minority cabinets, in majority cabinets, PMs have a
larger pool of candidates from which to recruit (Huber
& Martinez-Gallardo, 2008). Therefore, I expected that
minority cabinets will have fewer technocrats and
fewer politically experienced experts than their major-
ity counterparts (H1a). The fractionalization of cabi-
nets may restrict the PM’s opportunities to recruit
experts. Fractionalized cabinets often experience a high
level of intra-coalitional conflicts (Warwick, 1994), which
decreases the PM’s opportunities to appoint politically
experienced experts because their appointments may
lead to additional delegation problems. In highly fraction-
alized cabinets, PMs will prefer to appoint technocrats
instead of politically experienced experts (H1b).
The delegation theory also suggests that PMs and
presidents have a greater need for ministerial expertise
in times of economic crisis (e.g., Alexiadou & Gunaydin,
2019). Therefore, poor economic situations (i.e., an eco-
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nomic downturn and high inflation) will increase the
likelihood of the appointment of both technocrats and
politically experienced ministers (H1c). Expert ministers
are also more common in times of political crises (com-
pare Pastorella, 2016). In particular, in countries with a
low level of democracy, parties are expected to be less
consolidated and, as a consequence, less able to con-
trol ministerial appointments. Therefore, I expect that
technocrats and politically experienced experts aremore
likely to be recruited in countries with a low level of
electoral democracy (H1d). Unconsolidated party sys-
tems are also expected to be the phenomenon of demo-
cratic transition. I anticipated that both technocrats
and politically experienced experts are more common
in the earlier periods of transition, eventually disap-
pearing when the democracies become more consoli-
dated (H1e).
The second set of hypotheses is related to the tech-
nocratic populism approach. The literature suggests that
technocrats are the best choice for populists during polit-
ical crises. As for indicators of a political crisis, I will use
the minority status and the cabinet’s fractionalization.
Minority cabinets need to seek parliamentary support
beyond their parties, which may be difficult to do in ide-
ologically fractionalized parliaments. As a consequence,
minority cabinets are less stable than theirmajority coun-
terparts. Similarly, in order to avoid aminority status, ide-
ologically diverse partiesmay build a coalition. Such coali-
tions are known for a high level of internal conflicts and,
as a result, their instability (Warwick, 1994). Under both
circumstances, populists will appoint more technocrats
to their cabinets to prevent party conflicts (H2a).
The technocratic populist literature also suggests
that populists appoint more technocrats during an eco-
nomic crisis in order to be able to realize unpopu-
lar reforms (e.g., Buštíková & Guasti, 2019). Therefore,
I expect that poor economic conditions (i.e., an economic
downturn and high inflation) will lead to more tech-
nocratic appointments (H2b). Finally, studies on tech-
nocratic populism have argued that populist parties
with technocratic appeal have emerged in the 2000s
(Pop-Eleches, 2010). Therefore, I expect that the more
years since the democratic transition has passed, the
more technocrats will be appointed to cabinets (H2c).
According to the semi-presidentialism approach,
popularly elected presidents are more interested in
appointing politically inexperienced ministers because
of their expertise and their political dependence on the
president (e.g., Tavits, 2009). Therefore, I expect that cab-
inets under popularly elected presidents (i.e., in semi-
presidential systems) will include more technocrats than
politically experienced experts (H3a). The presidential
opportunities to appoint experts to cabinets should be
even higher if the presidents can discretionally dismiss
cabinets (as in Croatia until 2000). I expected, there-
fore, that if popularly elected presidents have extensive
cabinet-dismissal powers, the likelihood of technocratic
appointments will be higher, while the probability of
appointments of politically experienced experts will be
lower (H3b).
The fourth set of hypotheses addresses the com-
munist legacy effects of communist recruitment and
specialization patterns on the appointment of experts.
I expected that patterns of specialization common in
the communist ministries continue being applied after
the collapse of communism because of support from
both politicians and the general population. Therefore,
policy areas that were subject to expert appointments
during the late periods of communism will continue
being occupied by both technocrats and politically expe-
rienced experts after the regime change (H4a). Another
indicator of communist portfolio allocation is the type
of portfolio to which the minister is appointed dur-
ing the post-communist period. Following Hough (1973,
pp. 142–143), I used three variables to describe the
portfolios that were particularly specialized during the
communist regime: portfolios of foreign affairs/defense,
portfolio of finance/economy, and portfolio of social
affairs/education. Because of the small number of min-
isters in some of these portfolios, I combined the respec-
tive portfolios in these categories. I expect that these
portfolios will be occupied by both technocrats and polit-
ically experienced experts rather than by party politi-
cians (H4b).
The socio-demographic characteristics of the minis-
ter were not used in the analysis because the age of
the ministers does not show any strong variation and
the proportion of female ministers is extremely low in
some of our sample countries. Using these variables,
empirical models failed to converge (full details are not
reported here).
4.2. Data
This analysis was based on biographical information
about 2,382 ministers from 106 cabinets. The data
set encompasses the years 1991 to 2012. It includes
information from all 11 post-communist new EU mem-
ber states: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Croatia, Bulgaria, Slovenia, and
Romania. All of these countries have experienced at
least three consecutive lower-chamber elections since
the collapse of communism, during which the country’s
Polity score was six or higher. Thus, I excluded authori-
tarian regimes. The exception to this rule is Croatia from
1990 until 2000, when its Polity IV score was below
six. Because I aimed to analyze the entire population
of new EU democracies, this country was included in
the analyses.
4.3. Method
Two considerations guided the selection of the method.
First, because the dependent variables are binary, it is
necessary to use a binary logistic regression. Second,
I assumed some country-specific heterogeneity not cap-
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tured by the political and individual variables used in
this analysis. Therefore, I use fixed effects at the level of
countries and calculate robust standard errors adjusted
by country.
4.4. Results
Descriptively, from the early 1990s until 2012, approx-
imately 44% of all ministers in post-communist new
democracies were experts in the portfolio to which they
were appointed. There was, however, considerable vari-
ation across countries. For example, Latvia, Hungary,
Slovakia, and Croatia comprise the group of countries
that are less favorable toward experts in cabinets than
other post-communist countries (Figure 1). Bulgarian
and Lithuanian cabinets, by contrast, have been most
favorable toward experts in cabinets. Moreover, while
in Bulgaria and Lithuania, technocrats comprise the
largest proportion of expert ministers, politically expe-
rienced experts have been more common in Czech and
Estonian cabinets.
The results of a binary logistic regression for each
dependent variable (i.e., technocrats and politically expe-
rienced experts) are reported in Table 1 as odds ratios
(exp(B)). The coefficient above 1means that the determi-
nant increases the probability of appointing the respec-
tive group of expert ministers compared to party politi-
cians without expertise, while the coefficient below 1
means that this probability decreases.
Model 1 (Table 1) shows that neither a popularly
elected president nor aminority cabinetwas a significant
determinant of technocratic appointments. In contrast,
high cabinet fractionalization decreased the probability
of technocratic appointments. A marginal analysis has
shown that in single-party governments, the predicted
proportion of technocrats was approximately 34%, in
coalitions with six or more partners; this proportion was
expected to be below 10% (full results are not presented
here). The likelihood of technocratic appointments was
higher if the presidents had extensive non-legislative
powers (i.e., discretional cabinet dismissal); in these sys-
tems, the predicted proportion of technocrats was 24%.
In systems in which the presidents lacked the cabinet dis-
missal power, this proportion was expected to be 18%
(full results are not presented here).
Neither inflation nor the time since transition nor
the electoral democracy index was a significant explana-
tory factor of technocratic appointments. However, tech-
nocrats tend to be often appointed to cabinets in coun-
tries experiencing amassive economic crisis and become
less widespread in times of economic growth (Figure 2).
The communist legacy determinants, by contrast,
provided the most substantial explanation of the
appointment of technocratic ministers. If the portfolio
was subject to expert appointments during communism,
it was three timesmore likely to be occupied by a techno-
crat during the post-communist period (Model 1; see also
Figure 3). Patterns of specialization used in the commu-
nist period appear to survive the regime change, except
for appointments to portfolios of foreign affairs and
defense. The likelihood of a technocrat to be appointed
to the portfolios of finance/economy as well as of the
portfolios of social affairs/educationwas 1.4 times higher
than appointments to the other types of portfolios.
Regarding the appointments of politically experi-
enced experts (Table 1, Model 2), the strongest determi-
nants for the appointment of experts with political expe-
rience were communist legacies. If the respective port-
folio was occupied by an expert during communism, the
chances were approximately 2.5 times higher that this
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Figure 1. The proportion of technocrats and politically experienced experts in post-communist cabinets (in %).
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Table 1. The determinants of the appointments of expert ministers to post-communist cabinets (as odds ratios).
Technocrats Politically experienced experts
(Model 1) (Model 2)
Minority cabinet 0.97 0.99
(0.20) (0.12)
Cabinet fractionalization 0.77** 1.03
(0.06) (0.05)
Popularly elected president 1.31 0.84
(0.38) (0.14)




Economic growth 0.95*** 1.02
(0.01) (0.01)
Electoral Democracy Index 2.90 1.97
(2.61) (1.20)
Time since the communist transition 1.02 0.99
(0.02) (0.01)
Portfolio allocation to an expert during communism 3.01*** 2.51***
(0.34) (0.44)
Portfolio of foreign affairs/defense 1.33 1.35
(0.37) (0.28)
Portfolio of finance/economy 1.37** 1.43**
(0.86) (0.18)
Portfolio of social affairs/education 1.39*** 1.20
(0.11) (0.17)
Log psydolikelihood −965.80 −1054.52
N countries 11 11
N 2047 2047
Linktest hat2 −0.07 −0.43
p = (0.13) p = (0.11)
Akaike’s information criterion 1951.60 2129.04
Bayesian information criterion 2007.84 2185.28
Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05; fixed effects at the country level; robust standard errors adjusted by country are in
parentheses.
portfolio would be headed by a politically experienced
expert than by a politician (Figure 3). Finally, such minis-
ters had a 1.4 times higher chance to be appointed to the
portfolio associated with finance and economy.
5. Survival of Expert Ministers in New Democracies
Once expert ministers are appointed, questions arise
about how long they stay. Each of the discussed
approaches expects thatministers without political expe-
rience (i.e., technocrats) and politically experienced min-
isters will have different chances of surviving in cab-
inet. Delegation theory stresses the minister’s politi-
cal loyalty as the major credential for a cabinet posi-
tion. Accordingly, ministers with political experience
(whether experts or not) should remain in their posi-
tions longer than ministers without political experi-
ence (i.e., technocrats). Various studies on ministerial
careers in parliamentary systems have confirmed this
assumption (e.g., Berlinski, Dewan, & Dowding, 2010;
Huber & Martinez-Gallardo, 2008; Indridason & Kam,
2008). Politically inexperienced ministers present differ-
ent issue. PMs can easily dismiss them. Appointment of
these ministers during crises allows the PM to shift the
blame for electorally unpopular decisions, the cabinet’s
poor performance, or even scandals (Semenova, 2018;
Yong & Hazell, 2011).
Technocratic populism studies have yet to deal with
the issue of ministerial survival. However, researchers
argue that populist parties with technocratic appeal are
highly personalized (Pop-Eleches, 2010). Therefore, once
in government, populist party leaders would assume
the prime ministerial position and be the most power-
ful actors to affect the cabinet survival of technocrats.
I expect that provided the continuity of party leadership
and party in government, technocrats appointed by pop-
ulists will remain in their positions longer than ministers
with political experience.
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Figure 2. Adjusted predictions for the effect of economic growth on the appointments of technocrats (with 95% CIs). Note:
Based on Model 1, all covariates are set at means.
Semi-presidentialism predicts that more politically
inexperienced (even non-partisan) ministers to be
recruited in these systems. Single-country and compar-
ative studies on ministerial terminations in European
semi-presidential countries have revealed that, in these
systems, ministers have often been reappointed to sub-
sequent cabinets once the initial cabinet ends (Huber &
Martinez-Gallardo, 2004, p. 39; Semenova & Dowding,
2019). Researchers assume that in semi-presidential sys-
tems, PMs and presidents will try to minimize the prob-
ability of intra-executive conflicts. For PMs, a popularly
elected president will restrict her discretion to fire min-
isters to a similar degree as coalitions—in particular,
if the minister envisaged for dismissal is a presidential
appointee (Semenova & Dowding, 2019). For presidents,
the best strategy to minimize intra-executive conflict is
to promote a non-partisan technocrat, who would be
able to work with PMs from different parties.
Finally, following the communist legacy argument,
one may expect that the appointments of experts to
policy areas, which were dominated by experts dur-
ing the communism, are rationally motivated by the
increased demand for expert knowledge for performing
in this portfolio. The source for this demand could be
the PM, the president, public opinion, or external circum-











Communist legacy of portfolio allocation
Technocrats Politically experienced experts
Figure 3. Adjusted predictions for the effect of communist portfolio allocation on the predicted proportion of experts (with
95% CIs). Note: Based on Models 1 and 2, all covariates are set at means.
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remain in their positions longer than party politicians
without expertise.
5.1. Hypotheses and Indicators
Based on delegation theory, the PM’s characteristics are
an important factor in the probability of ministerial sur-
vival (see the Supplementary File). The first characteristic
iswhether the PM is partisan. Delegation theory takes for
granted that the PM is partisan because she is selected
from among members of the ruling coalition. However,
post-communist countries have seen non-partisan PMs
head a caretaker cabinet or be appointed to a coalition
because the coalition partners could not find a candi-
date acceptable to all. For a partisan PM, a politically
experienced minister is the best choice from the del-
egation perspective. I assume that the opposite holds
true for non-partisan PMs who will prefer to work with
technocrats instead of politically experienced ministers
(H5a). The second factor is the change in the PM (i.e.,
when the previous cabinet ended, and a new PM is in
charge). In this case, the new PM will not be keen to
take over politically experienced ministers of her prede-
cessor, except for technocrats (H5b). The third factor is
the party continuity in government. I assume that if the
same party is leading the subsequent cabinet, there will
be a high probability that the PM will replace the minis-
ters, in particular politically experienced ones, to intro-
duce new policies or signal change (H5c).
Based on semi-presidentialism studies, the most
important factor ofministerial survival is the existence of
a popularly elected president. If popularly elected presi-
dents prefer to nominate politically inexperienced minis-
ters, theseministers should be able to survive the change
of cabinet and work with different PMs. Therefore, in
semi-presidential systems, technocrats are expected to
be more durable than their politically experienced col-
leagues (H6a).
Following technocratic populism studies, the change
of PM and party in government will be the most critical
factors affecting ministerial durability. Because techno-
populist parties prefer to appoint technocrats to cab-
inets, I expect that if the same party forms the sub-
sequent cabinet, there is a high probability that tech-
nocrats will be re-appointed (H7a). Technocrats will also
have lower risks of being dismissed if there is any change
in the PM’s candidacy because they were appointed
because of their expertise and should be able to work
with different PMs (H7b). Studies have shown that pop-
ulists appoint more technocrats during economic crises
(e.g., Buštíková&Guasti, 2019). Therefore, improvement
of the economic situation will be considered an out-
comeof technocratic appointments, and technocratswill
remain in their positions longer (H7c).
Finally, communist legacies studies suggest that the
administration of some policy areas requires more pro-
fessional expertise than others. Therefore, technocrats
will survive in the portfolios traditionally dominated
by experts (including finance/economy and foreign
affairs/defense) longer than their politically experienced
counterparts without expertise (H8a).
I also use a set of control variables derived from
ministerial career studies (e.g., Berlinski et al., 2010).
Specifically, ministers have higher risks of being dis-
missed if the cabinet is a minority compared to majority
cabinets and if this cabinet is highly fractionalized. Both
politically experienced ministers and technocrats will
have higher risks of being dismissed if they experienced
a gap between appointments because their survival of
the PM would be of less importance. Finally, I assume
that with the consolidation of democratic regimes in the
region, ministerial durability will also be higher because
parties will get more control over ministerial appoint-
ments (e.g., Semenova, 2018).
5.2. Method
Because I am interested in time-to-event, I conducted a
survival analysis. The dependent variable is the time of
a ministerial appointment in days. A number of consider-
ations guide the selection of the method. First, because
I am interested in the effects of the changes in PMs and
party continuity in government, the ministerial career
has to be understood from a holistic perspective. Each
minister may experience a number of failures (i.e., dis-
missals) over his career. Second, these failures have a
natural order (i.e., a minister cannot experience the sec-
ond dismissal before he has experienced the first one).
Therefore, I used the conditional risk set Cox regres-
sionmodel proposed by Prentice,Williams, and Peterson
(1981), which takes both considerations into account.
In this model, the robust standard errors are stratified
by the number of failures. Because the variable Political
experience of theminister does not fulfill the proportion-
ality assumptions of the Cox regression (Cox, 1972), I con-
ducted models on sub-samples of ministers stratified by
their political experience.
5.3. Results
Descriptively, approximately 64% of all post-communist
ministers had been reappointed at least once. The results
are presented in Table 2 as hazard ratios. A coefficient
above 1 means that the minister has a higher risk of
being dismissed; a coefficient below 1—has a lower risk
of being dismissed.
The first result was that in new democracies, minis-
ters under popularly elected presidents remained in their
positions longer than under indirectly elected presidents,
although this effect ismarginal for politically experienced
ministers. Technocrats (Table 2, Model 1) have higher
chances of remaining in cabinet if there is a cabinet under
a new PM. Moreover, their re-nomination to a new cab-
inet was not related to the continuity of the PM’s party.
For politically experienced ministers (Table 2, Model 2),
the risk of being dismissed by a non-partisan PM was
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Table 2. Stratified conditional risk set Cox regression of ministerial survival in post-communist countries (in exp(B)).
Minister with no political experience Politically experienced ministers
(Model 1) (Model 2)
Non-partisan PM 0.66 1.85**
(0.20) (0.42)
The change of the PM 0.61*** 1.02†
(0.14) (0.13)
The PM’s party remained in the government 1.19 1.21
(0.31) (0.17)
Popularly elected president 0.61*** 0.65*
(0.07) (0.05)




Communist portfolio allocation 1.10 0.97
(0.11) (0.08)
Portfolio of foreign affairs/defense 0.98 1.12
(0.18) (0.12)
Portfolio of finance/economy 1.10 1.24†
(0.17) (0.14)
Control variables
Cabinet fractionalization 1.04 1.07
(0.05) (0.04)
Minority cabinet 1.14 1.21*
(0.15) (0.11)
Gap in the ministerial career 1.08 0.97
(0.28) (0.14)
Years since the transition 1.03* 1.02*
(0.01) (0.01)
Log pseudolikelihood −1944.08 −3505.61
N of ministers 633 832
N of failures 395 707
N of observations 12485 21842




Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1; robust standard errors stratified by the number of failures.
almost two times higher than by a partisan PM. These
ministers had a higher risk of being dismissed if there
was a change in the PM and if they headed the portfo-
lio of finance and economy, although in both cases, the
effect is marginally significant.
6. Discussion and Conclusion
6.1. Discussion of Empirical Results
Among the four theoretical approaches discussed in this
article, delegation theory and technocratic populism pro-
vide better explanations for the appointments of expert
ministers and their survival in the cabinet. Confirming
expectations derived from delegation theory, the deter-
minants for the appointments of politically experienced
experts do not significantly differ from those explain-
ing appointments of party politicians without expertise.
Political loyalty appears to be the most important cre-
dential for the appointment of both groups of minis-
ters. Furthermore, technocratic appointments are often
indeed a sign of a government’s dysfunctional develop-
ment because theseministers have high chances of being
appointed during an economic downturn. Regarding the
determinants of ministerial durability in new democra-
cies, politically experienced ministers have higher risks
of being dismissed by non-partisan PMs and in the case
of prime ministerial change.
Delegation theory, however, cannot explain the sur-
vival of technocrats (expert ministers without political
experience). Technocrats have higher chances of remain-
ing in their positions if there was a change in the PM’s
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candidacy. Moreover, they have long careers indepen-
dently of the continuity of the PM’s party in govern-
ment and the PM’s partisan status. However, this dura-
bility exists as long as technocrats remain politically
unaffiliated—otherwise, their careers will be affected by
the determinants applied to politically experienced min-
isters (see Table 2). These findings support expectations
based on the technocratic populism literature.
Communist legacies are the only determinant that
explains the appointments of technocrats and politi-
cally experienced experts compared to party politicians
without expertise. Specifically, the patterns of commu-
nist portfolio specialization (e.g., finance and economy)
remained in place after the regime change. The policy
area of social affairs and education are more often occu-
pied by technocrats than party politicians. I assume that
this arrangement is both the result of communist lega-
cies and a recruitment strategy of PMs to shift the blame
for any unpopular decisions in these highly politicized
policy areas. However, holding these specific portfolios
does not protect the minister from dismissal, as our sur-
vival analysis has shown. Politically experienced minis-
ters even have a slightly higher risk of being dismissed
if they hold finance or economy portfolios.
Finally, against the expectations of semi-presidential-
ism studies, technocratic appointments are not higher
in systems with popularly elected presidents. They
are higher in systems that granted their presidents
substantial cabinet-dismissal powers. Confirming semi-
presidentialism studies, technocrats under popularly
elected presidents enjoy higher durability than under
indirectly elected presidents.
6.2. Theoretical Implications
Populists consider themselves proponents of ‘ordinary
people’ who have been betrayed by the political estab-
lishment. Corrupt elites have robbed the people of their
sovereignty, manipulated them using mediated politics,
and failed to discover the common good for the entire
society (Caramani, 2017). A newly emerged type of pop-
ulist parties, technocratic populists, argue that they will
use apolitical expertise as the best strategy to provide
effective and universal solutions to societal problems.
In the cases of party system deconsolidation, democratic
decline, and the implosion of the left-right political divide
(e.g., Buštíková & Guasti, 2019; Pop-Eleches, 2010), tech-
nocratic appeal and the absence of clear ideological ori-
entation are key elements of the electoral success of
such parties in new democracies.
In this article, I have analyzed the technocratic
aspect of ministerial appointments and survival in new
democracies. What implications can be made from
this analysis? First, new democracies provide fruitful
ground for techno-populist parties. Because of commu-
nist legacies, there is a congruence between technocratic
appointments to certain portfolios and public expecta-
tions for expertise in government. Public positive atti-
tudes toward technocracy and technocrats in govern-
ment support populists in their strategy to use techno-
cratic appeal.
Second, by cultivating their image of challengers
to mainstream parties, populists politicize technocracy.
Techno-populist parties do not just promise to bring
in more experts to government, which may already be
the case in governments formed by mainstream parties.
Populists vow to bring in more technocrats; in other
words, they promise to bring in outsiders, just like these
parties define themselves. Through the politicization
of expertise, populists introduce qualitative differences
among experts (i.e., being a mainstream versus outsider
expert), thereby undermining technocracy’s very basis as
apolitical governance by expertise and knowledge.
Third, in their technocratic appeal, techno-populist
parties are undemocratic and, ironically, elitist at the
same time. They are undemocratic because they dismiss
the input and processual legitimacy essential in demo-
cratic systems and stress the output legitimacy (in the
form of policy results). These parties are also elitist
because they believe that experts, not voters, can make
political decisions and that only they, technocratic pop-
ulists, can define whom these experts are.
Fourth, technocratic governance exposes the impor-
tance of democratic accountability. My results have
shown that in new democracies, technocrats sur-
vive political changes (e.g., a change of the PM or
the PM’s party in government). Using the commu-
nist legacies argument, I have underlined the positive
aspects of technocracy (e.g., policy continuity and skilled
decision-making taken by a technocrat). From a demo-
cratic perspective, these findings suggest that technoc-
racy may also have negative aspects. As studies on
techno-populist parties have shown (e.g., Buštíková &
Guasti, 2019), once elected, these parties have often
tried to reduce the opportunities for political participa-
tion and representation and increase their chances to
consolidate power. Technocracy is democratically unac-
countable. Technocrats who help populists weaken the
institutes of mediated politics and undermine procedu-
ral legitimacy by applying their expert knowledge are an
underrated threat to democracy.
6.3. Further Research
The presented results show the ramifications of minis-
terial appointments, party politics, populism, and tech-
nocracy in former communist countries. Extant studies
on ministerial appointment and survival have ignored
the importance of the minister’s expertise in new
democracies (e.g., Neto & Strøm, 2006). This aspect
has to be taken into account in further comparative
studies. Moreover, none of the studies on ministerial
careers in former communist countries (e.g., Schleiter &
Morgan-Jones, 2009) has dealt with the effects of com-
munist legacies. This issuewarrants greater study in order
to identify the mechanisms behind this persistence.
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Further studies are required to explain the variation
in the country-specific preferences for technocrats or
politically experienced experts in the region. Whether it
is institutions, political culture, public opinion, or other
factors that determine who is appointed needs to be
examined in a more detailed way. Finally, this research
opens new avenues for studying the effect of tech-
nocracy on policy-making, public perception of govern-
ments, and democratic stability. For example, the use
of technocracy by populist parties while in government
presents a topic that warrants further research.
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